M uch has been said about the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its proposed changes since it was installed. The comments focus mainly on fl exibility of the rules, how to tackle misbehaviour and how to secure a non-partisan implementation of the rules.
1 Further, there is fear that making the SGP rules less strict would mean higher infl ation rates, higher interest rates, and a weaker euro.
2 What is missing in these comments are the possible effects on the European economies of a coordinated fi scal policy. Such a policy might result in much smaller national public defi cits than might be expected from the non-coordinated expansion of public expenditure.
The reason for an increase of public expenditure is clear. The European economy has been stagnant for some time now. In some EU countries there has even been talk of a shrinking economy, with all its consequences for job opportunities and government finances. For many experts, the recipe for recovery is to be found in the United States, where the government boosts the economy by reducing taxes and increasing military spending. Further, the world economy is stimulated by China's runaway economic growth. Europe has too little to set against these examples. If it is to speed up recovery, Europe too needs an active fi scal policy. In this article we sketch the possible effects of such a policy, with the help of an input-output model.
For a long time, the Dutch government has chosen to keep its projected budget defi cit to a minimum by means of cuts. There are not too many alternatives for a small European country like the Netherlands. An anti-cyclical fi scal policy, in which the reduction in private investment is balanced by an increase in public spending or a reduction in taxes, is not an option because the open character of the economy allows a large proportion of the benefi ts to fl ow abroad, leading ultimately to an increase in the budget defi cit.
3 Only a concerted effort by all the euro countries together can provide relief.
Since the introduction of the euro, the euro countries have opted for a number of stabilising measures with the aim of limiting infl ation and maintaining the value of the euro in relation to other important currencies like the American dollar. The most signifi cant of these is undoubtedly the rule that the government budget of all EU countries should be kept in balance. We have seen that these stabilisation measures have worked so well that the euro has become a strong currency. However, one of the effects of this is that while import costs of goods from outside Europe have gone down, export costs have gone up. A strong euro has not, therefore, contributed to economic recovery. Furthermore, the stabilisation treaty has made national fi scal policy measures (like increased spending budgets and tax reductions) dysfunctional, without replacing them with a coordinated European fi scal policy. We W. J. M. Heijman* can safely assert that the only remaining form of European macro-economic policy is monetary policy.
The Need for a European Fiscal Policy
The monetary policy in European countries is decided by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. This institution has within its brief two important and interconnected tasks: (1) limiting infl ation, and (2) stabilising the euro. We can confi rm that the European Central Bank is successful in these tasks: infl ation is low and the euro is a stable currency. In contrast to the Federal Reserve Bank the European Central Bank is not responsible for economic growth and the related development of employment opportunities. 4 In Europe this is still entirely a matter for national governments, whose hands are tied by the stabilisation treaty. It would therefore be a good idea to reformulate the role of the European Central Bank in line with the American model.
Projected Effects of a Dutch Government Budget Increase
The model describes the internal and external trade relations of the fi fteen EU countries. 5 The economies of these countries are interdependent, on account of internal trade between them. 6 A rise in government spending in one country affects not only its own national economy but also that of other member countries, due to the "trickle down effect". 7 In a small, open economy, such as that of the Netherlands, this is considerable, which means that a stimulating fi scal policy launched by the Dutch government alone has little impact on the size of the national economy but a big impact on the budget defi cit. This is illustrated in Table  1 . A change in government spending of 5% leads to a rise in GNP of 2.2%.
8 This is in line with a multiplier effect of only 1.19 (the change in GNP divided by the total amount of the increase of public spending).
This would have turned the small fi nancial surplus of 2001 into a fi nancial defi cit of almost 1% of the national income, which is in fact well within the maximum permitted defi cit of 3%.
When drawing comparisons with the countries around us, it is striking that Belgium and Ireland, with 
Effects of a German Government Budget Increase
In this scenario, the country with the highest national income increases its budget by 5%. It can be seen in Table 2 that Germany, with a rise in GNP of 3%, would benefi t more from its own increase than the Netherlands would. Germany's economy is more closed than that of the Netherlands, where increasing government spending by 5% would only boost economic growth by 2.2%. The multiplier for Germany is 1.71, compared to 1.19 for the Netherlands.
The striking difference between these scenarios is that while the German budget defi cit would grow by 0.7% as a result of a budget increase, the Dutch deficit would grow by 1%. This is undoubtedly linked to the greater openness of the Dutch economy, and the consequent, relatively small, scale of the multiplier.
In comparison with other countries, where the income would increase by a few tenths of one percent, the Netherlands, with a growth of 0.54%, would benefi t the most from the German initiative. Equally, of all these countries, the Netherlands suffers more negative consequences from the current stagnation of the German economy.
Effects of an Increase in Government Spending by All EU Member Countries
What would happen if all the EU member states increased their government spending by 5%? The prediction is that the budget defi cit would not increase dramatically.
In Table 3 we can see the calculated effects of a joint spending increase on national income, the budget defi cit and the trade balance of the EU member states. GNP would go up by between 3.24% (Ireland) and 4.48% (Greece). In no single country would a joint initiative boost the economy by more than 5%. The reason for this is that demand within the EU would go up, while the demand for EU products in the rest of the world is assumed to remain constant. Therefore, incomes from exports to countries outside the EU would not change, which puts a break on economic growth in member countries.
As far as budget defi cits are concerned, the following points are noteworthy. In comparison with 2001, defi cits would go up and surpluses would go down, although by smaller amounts than those that would result from unilateral spending increases by individual governments. For the Netherlands for example, a unilateral increase would create a defi cit of 0.94%, while a joint one would create a defi cit of only 0.29%. In Germany, the fi gures are 2.78% for a unilateral increase and 2.49% for a joint one.
A joint increase in spending would worsen the trade balance in all the member states. The degree to which this would happen would depend on the level of the marginal import quota. The projected increase in the trade balance defi cit after a joint spending increase ranges from 0.23% (Spain) to 0.46% (Sweden) of the GNP. This is because exports to countries outside the EU are assumed to be constant, while imports from these countries depend on the incomes of the member states. In this case, economic growth throughout the EU would automatically worsen the trade balance of member countries.
In Table 4 , the multipliers and the economic growth of EU countries are compared.
The multiplier shows the rate of increase in income per extra euro spent. This clearly differs per country. A country with a fairly open economy has a low multiplier if it implements a policy of stimulation. A country with a relatively closed economy, on the other hand, has a high multiplier. The size of a country's multiplier in a joint policy of stimulation depends on trade relations Table 4 Multiplier Effect and Income Growth with other EU member states. Ireland, for instance, has a fairly low multiplier (1.21) in a unilateral increase in government spending, whereas its intensive trade relations with other EU states lead to a very high multiplier (2.70) in the scenario of a joint increase. The Netherlands has quite an open economy (an individual multiplier of 1.19), but because a high proportion of its exports go outside the EU, the multiplier in the scenario of a joint EU stimulation policy is lower than that of Ireland (2.13).
In terms of economic growth, Ireland would benefi t least from either the unilateral increase or the joint EU-wide increase. This shows that a high multiplier does not always mean a high economic growth rate. Since the increase is represented by a percentage of overall government spending, a relatively small government sector would entail a small increase, which in turn would limit the impact of the increase on the economy.
Discussion and Conclusion
The input-output model has, of course, its limitations and these include a lack of attention to dynamic or supply-driven factors. Further, it is well known that a Keynesian spending policy has a short term effect only. To restore the European economy in the long run a number of painful measures will have to be taken in other areas of the economy. For example, the labour market is in great need of reform in order to make it more fl exible. However, to make that work an impulse on the demand side of the economy will certainly contribute to the success of the proposed restructuring of the labour market. With a view to the reservations made, the results of the model calculations should be treated with a certain amount of caution.
However, what is more important is the philosophy behind the model. Because there is no question of a common fi scal policy in the EU, each EU country faces a "prisoner's dilemma", whereby it seems to be in each country's interests not to stimulate the economy, with the net result of a less than optimal European economic situation characterised by low economic growth and rising unemployment. The results of the model calculations show that a joint fi scal policy could really provide part of the solution to the current economic malaise.
The current economic situation in Europe is not very hopeful. The objectives of the European Central Bank are being reached, but this does not seem to be the key issue at the moment. It is much more important to stimulate job creation in Europe. Unfortunately, the dominance of monetary aims, the attendant (reformed) stabilisation pact and the absence of a coordinated fi scal policy mean that the euro countries do not have the option of the kind of anti-cyclical budget policy that is implemented in the USA by means of planned tax reductions and increased government spending.
Not even the largest member states, France and Germany, would be able to revive the European economy single-handedly. Both the European and the global economy have thus become dependent on economic growth in the USA and in emerging economies such as China and India. If this is insuffi cient, the feeble growth of the European economy will turn into a recession, bringing rising unemployment in its wake.
It is therefore imperative that, together with supply side measures, the euro countries develop a coordinated fi scal policy. If the European and global economy is to be stimulated, European governments must jointly implement a shrewd package of stimulation measures, geared not only to spending effects -important as these may be -but also to the longterm effects on, for example, the European knowledge economy. Like this, it cuts both ways. A joint initiative can limit the consequences for the national budget, even to the extent that the current stability requirements can be met.
